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Improved Algebraic MACs and Practical Keyed-Verification Anonymous Credentials (Barki, Brunet, Desmoulins, Traoré 2016)

Last modified: 2026-10-27

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-69453-5_20 · URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69453-5_20

Summary

Presents a new algebraic MAC derived from BBS+ and builds keyed-verification anonymous credentials (where issuer and verifier share a key) with presentation proofs that are cheaper than prior KVAC schemes and need no pairings (SAC 2016). Also proves the security of a more efficient BBS+ variant, which is why it is cited by the IRTF BBS draft. The same Orange group later designed BBS#.

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