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Anonymous Attestation Using the Strong Diffie Hellman Assumption Revisited (Camenisch, Drijvers, Lehmann 2016)

Last modified: 2026-10-27

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-45572-3_1 · URL: https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/663

Summary

Shows that the security proofs of several q-SDH-based Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) schemes are flawed and proposes a new, provably secure DAA scheme based on BBS+ signatures (TRUST 2016). Along the way it proves the security of BBS+ in a setting that allows a more efficient signature (dropping one element), cited by the IRTF BBS draft. Relevant to e-ID because DAA is the TPM/hardware analogue of holder-bound anonymous credentials.

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