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SoK: What Don't We Know? Understanding Security Vulnerabilities in SNARKs (Chaliasos, Ernstberger, Theodore, Wong, Jahanara, Livshits 2024)

Last modified: 2026-10-27

DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2402.15293 · URL: https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity24/presentation/chaliasos

Summary

Systematizes 141 real-world vulnerabilities in SNARK implementations and builds a taxonomy by layer (circuit, front end, back end, integration) and root cause. Under-constrained circuits are the most common class, followed by Fiat-Shamir and backend bugs (USENIX Security 2024). Essential reading for anyone deploying circuit-based credential proofs, and cited in BL26-SoK-AnonCreds as evidence of the security risks of general-purpose ZKPs.

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